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Imagine: it is January 20, 1961. John Kennedy has just given his inaugural
address. Idealism reigns. Optimism abounds. The world is changing. A new
generation is assuming the mantle of leadership. Kennedy would put us on a path
to the moon and solve entrenched problems, most notably de jure discrimination
against African Americans in much of the country.
The Warren Court was prepared to assist. Warren, Douglas, Black, Clark, and
Brennan are in Warren’s office. He has a text of the president’s speech, and he
reads from it: we must “undo the heavy burdens . . . [and] let the oppressed go
free.”1
The justices ask themselves what the Court could do to ease the heavy burdens
individuals bear when caught up in the American criminal justice system. There is
little doubt that many state systems in the 1950s were fundamentally unfair to
* Rutgers Board of Governors Professor of Law, Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar.
For comments on earlier drafts, I thank Joshua Dressler, Dan Medwed, Annabel Pollioni, and the audience at the
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1. See John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Inaugural Address (20 January 1961), VOICES OF DEMOCRACY: THE U.S.
ORATORY PROJECT, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/kennedy-inaugural-address-speech-text (last visited Apr.
4, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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suspects and defendants, particularly the vast majority who were indigent. Having
mustered a unanimous Court for Brown v. Board of Education,2 Warren would
undoubtedly have thought he could muster a majority to effect needed changes in
state criminal justice systems.
In that imaginary meeting, Chief Justice Warren would look at the state of
criminal “justice” in 1961. What would the former prosecutor see? Police in half
the states can conduct unreasonable searches and seizures without fear of losing
evidence because Wolf v. Colorado3 refused to require states to apply the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. Police in all fifty states are free to conduct
relentless interrogation and deny requests for counsel, as long as the police stay
within the spacious confines of the common law voluntariness norm.4 Fifteen
states do not provide lawyers for indigent felony defendants,5 and the Due Process
Clause is not violated unless defendants can show special circumstances that
require appointment of counsel.6 The result in most cases is a charade of a process
where the defendant has no expert legal advice. Moreover, prosecutors have no
duty to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense. Earl Warren would have
concluded that the Due Process Clause, as the Court had interpreted it, permitted
states to impose the worst of all worlds on defendants—lay defendants, who might
be innocent, forced to defend alone against experienced prosecutors aided with
evidence obtained by questionable police methods.
Warren might have asked himself: Can we remedy those problems and bring
the recalcitrant states in line? They tried.
But largely failed, I will argue. The Warren Court solutions were doomed to
failure, not because of Richard Nixon and his Court appointments, but because of
two flawed assumptions. First was the Court’s understanding of human nature.
Partaking of Kennedy’s optimism, the Warren Court thought that if it led, state
police, prosecutors, legislatures, and courts would follow even when they would
have preferred not to follow. It was not to be.
A related failure was the lack of understanding that criminal justice systems
are self-adjusting and tend toward crime control; take away one method of
efficiently solving and prosecuting crimes, and the system finds another way.
I wish to be clear. I am not saying the Warren Court made a mistake in deciding
its landmark criminal procedure cases. They stand as an enduring testament to the
American commitment to fairness, equality, and compassion. They probably, at
the margin, improved the lot of those who suffered the heavy burdens of our 1950s
state criminal justice systems. My claim is more modest: The criminal procedure
“revolution” was more revolutionary in what it promised than in what it delivered.
The “system” adjusted to the “revolution” in various ways, some obvious—the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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refusal of most state legislatures to provide adequate funding for indigent
defense7—and some not so obvious—the creation of more and more draconian
criminal penalties.8 And, a President Humphrey would not, in my judgment, have
made a difference in the long run. Both of the Warren Court’s failed assumptions
would have played out the same way.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDY TRAP
The Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the state court in
Mapp v. Ohio in the fall of 1960,9 weeks before Kennedy was elected. The case
was briefed and argued, principally on the ground that the First Amendment
protects possession of obscenity in one’s home.10 After the conference on the case,
five justices decided to make it a vehicle to overrule Wolf and force the states to
apply the exclusionary rule.11 Conventional wisdom is that the Court switched
theories because it was the perfect case to overrule Wolf. The Court would not be
letting a rapist or murderer go free but merely someone who possessed mildly
pornographic material.12
Yes of course, but that begs the question of why the Court thought it advisable
to overrule Wolf a mere twelve years after it was decided by a 6-3 vote. That, I
submit, is perhaps best explained as the first shot out of the cannon designed to
“undo the heavy burdens” placed on defendants in states that did not apply the
exclusionary rule. Whether the Court would have reached out to overrule Wolf if
Kennedy had not won the presidency, or merely decided the First Amendment
issue it would decide later in Stanley v. Georgia,13 is of course unknowable.
Following Wolf, some police took flagrant advantage of the “open door” to
admission in states that did not utilize the exclusionary rule. In Rochin v.
California, three deputy sheriffs broke into Rochin’s bedroom without a warrant
or consent.14 When he tried to swallow some capsules he grabbed from his bedside
table, three officers “jumped upon him” and attempted to extract the capsules from
his mouth.15 When they failed to keep Rochin from swallowing the capsules, the
officers handcuffed him and took him to a hospital where his stomach was

7. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045–46 (2006); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in
the Reform of Criminal Justice, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 924 (2013).
8. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997).
9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 868 (1960) (issuing its opinion on October 24).
10. See id. at 673 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1367–68 (1983).
12. Id. at 1367.
13. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects the private possession of obscenity).
14. 342 U.S. 165, 166–67 (1952).
15. Id.
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“pumped,” and he was forced to vomit.16 The vomit contained residue of morphine.
He was convicted of possession of morphine and sentenced to sixty days.17
When Rochin reached the Supreme Court in 1952, the Court found itself in an
uncomfortable position. The conduct of the state officers was offensive. But,
would the Court overrule Wolf only three years after it was decided? That was
surely unappetizing. So, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote Wolf, the
Court turned to a pure due process analysis. Due process of law includes not
treating suspects the way the officers treated Rochin. The methods of the deputy
sheriffs were “too close to the rack and the screw” to be permissible.18 And what
standard would courts apply to determine when police violated due process? They
would look to see whether the state conduct “shocks the conscience.”19
The Rochin solution suffered two major problems. First, one hopes modern
police search and seizure techniques rarely approach the rack and the screw,
meaning that the protection offered by Rochin was much more limited than the
Fourth Amendment requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable. Second,
“shock the conscience” has no readily understood definition. Of course,
“unreasonable searches and seizures” suffers a similar problem with
indeterminacy, but the Court is stuck with the constitutional text; it does not have
to offer standards or norms that are also maddeningly vague.
The indeterminacy problem with “shock the conscience” manifested itself a
mere two years after Rochin, once again surfacing in a California case. How would
the physical mistreatment of the suspect in Rochin compare to police putting a
microphone in the bedroom occupied by husband and wife and monitoring the
microphone for months? Police in Irvine v. California20 were treated to an audio
recording of everything that was said and done in that bedroom for months. Shock
your conscience? Not that of Justice Jackson, who wrote the plurality opinion in
Irvine. “However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us, they do not involve
coercion, violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus
eavesdropping.”21 Justice Frankfurter, the author of Rochin, dissented. His
conscience, along with that of Justice Burton, was shocked. “Surely the Court does
not propose to announce a new absolute, namely, that even the most reprehensible
means for securing a conviction will not taint a verdict so long as the body of the
accused was not touched by State officials.”22
Justice Clark, concurring in the judgment in Irvine, put his finger on the
problem with the Rochin approach: It “makes for such uncertainty and
unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell—other than by

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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guesswork—just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home
must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution.”23 He
also pointed the Warren Court’s way out of the mess—to revisit the decision in
Wolf not to require states to apply the exclusionary rule: “Perhaps strict adherence
to the tenor of that [Wolf] decision may produce needed converts for its
extinction.”24 This explains why Clark concurred in the judgment; he wanted to
hold the Court’s feet to the Wolf fire.
And nine years later, Wolf was indeed extinguished in an opinion by Justice
Clark. In Mapp v. Ohio,25 Clark had the bare minimum of votes he needed to
overrule Wolf and make Rochin largely irrelevant.26 The tenor of the Mapp opinion
was that the Court had finally solved the indeterminacy problem of Wolf-RochinIrvine.
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state
intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured
by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic [Fourth
Amendment] right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee
against that very same unlawful conduct.27
Case closed. State and federal courts would apply the exclusionary rule. Did
the police violate the Fourth Amendment when conducting a search for and seizure
of item X? If so, X is inadmissible in state or federal court.
Of course, suppressing X is an easy judicial chore when, as in Mapp, X consists
of four mildly pornographic books and a hand-drawn obscene picture.28 It is a
much more unpleasant task when the challenged evidence proves a murder, a rape,
or an armed robbery. 1960s idealism might have suggested courts would follow
the Court’s lead and apply the exclusion remedy without “peeking” through to see
what kind of crime is being prosecuted. But, that was not to be the case.
The discretion that Wolf left state courts as to remedy, and that Mapp removed,
quickly resurfaced when courts considered what is a reasonable search and seizure
and what exceptions it should make to the exclusion remedy. As to exceptions to
exclusion, a defendant convicted of a brutal murder asked the courts to reverse his
conviction on the ground that the police officer used the wrong search warrant

23. Id. at 138 (Clark, J., concurring in judgment).
24. Id. at 139.
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26. Rochin still applies in situations where the Fourth Amendment is not violated. In Hernandez v. State,
548 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1977), for example, the police could rely on an exigent circumstance
exception to the Fourth Amendment, but Rochin was nonetheless available to argue for exclusion.
27. Id. at 655–56.
28. Stewart, supra note 11, at 1367.
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form.29 Because of the form error, the warrant authorized a search for controlled
substances but not for evidence of a murder. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the search of the defendant’s home could not be authorized by the
warrant, and therefore the evidence of the murder had to be suppressed. The
murder conviction was reversed. The United States Supreme Court declined to
follow the state court, instead applying its newly-created good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.30 Letting Ms. Mapp walk free is a very different judicial
chore than letting a murderer walk. A murder defendant’s conviction stood despite
the Fourth Amendment violation. The Court now recognizes good faith exceptions
to the exclusionary rule for searches based on a search warrant even though the
officer violated the requirement of “knock and announce”;31 for arrests based on a
statute later held unconstitutional;32 for arrests based on a doctrine later
overruled;33 for arrests on insufficient cause if there was an arrest warrant
outstanding even though the officer did not know about the warrant;34 for arrests
based on a warrant that a judicial employee mistakenly told the officer was
outstanding;35 and for arrests based on a warrant that a police employee mistakenly
told the officer was outstanding.36 Plenty of good faith to go around and lots of
evidence introduced!
James Spiotto’s 1973 study contains empirical evidence suggesting that judges
“bend” the Fourth Amendment in cases of serious crimes.37 Spiotto found that, in
cases of violent, serious felonies, Chicago judges granted 8% of motions to
suppress while 82% were successful in narcotics and gambling cases.38 To be sure,
there are confounding variables. Police are surely more careful to obey the Fourth
Amendment in murder, rape, and robbery cases because the consequence of losing
evidence is more serious. And, evidence is usually harder to obtain in drug cases,
leading police to take more Fourth Amendment risks in these, typically minor,
cases. Still, a difference as stark as the one Spiotto found suggests that courts will
“bend” the Fourth Amendment to permit a search for truth when a dangerous
criminal might otherwise go free. And Spiotto’s study was before the Court created
the various good-faith exceptions to exclusion. Courts now have more tools to
29. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987 (1984); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).
30. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897.
31. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___ (2016) (describing the doctrine
as “attenuation of the taint” of the unlawful entry).
32. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
33. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).
34. Strieff, 579 U.S. (describing the doctrine as “attenuation of the taint” of the unlawful arrest).
35. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
36. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
37. James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973).
38. In murder, rape, and robbery cases, a total of 49 motions to suppress were made; only 4 were successful,
a rate of 8%. In narcotics and gambling cases, 1,149 motions to suppress were made; 941 were successful, a
success rate of 82%. See id. at 250, tbl. 2.
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permit them to avoid exclusion.
Consider the seven years and three trials it took to send Robert Reldan to prison
for life.39 Within a period of ten days in October 1975, two young New Jersey
women disappeared.40 Their naked bodies were found thirteen miles apart later that
month. State police and the FBI had reason to suspect Reldan, a sex offender
recently paroled from prison.41 After Reldan came to authorities’ attention as a
suspect in the murders, they developed probable cause to believe he had broken
into two houses and stolen property, fleeing the scene in a particular automobile.
Police arrested Reldan for the break-ins and impounded his car. They got a
search warrant to search the car for evidence of the break-ins, “including, but not
limited to, fingerprints, implements used to commit the break and entries, stolen
property listed on the attached sheet and anything else of evidentiary value that a
complete and thorough search might disclose.” The attached sheet “listed
numerous items of jewelry and other personal property.”42 The FBI assisted with
the execution of the warrant, which included vacuuming the car’s interior. Hairs
and other minute particles seized from the car were examined microscopically by
the FBI, producing forensic evidence used to link Reldan to the murders.
Prior to his first trial for the two murders, Reldan made a Fourth Amendment
motion to suppress the forensic evidence on the ground that vacuuming the car and
examining the contents with microscopes exceeded the scope of a warrant
ostensibly designed to permit a search for evidence of break-ins.43 The trial judge
agreed and ordered the evidence suppressed; the State did not appeal that ruling.44
Without forensic evidence, the State’s case was, evidently, not terribly strong, and
the jury could not reach a verdict.45 For the second trial, the State improved its case
by introducing evidence that Reldan had prior convictions for similar crimes
against women who survived the attacks. The judge admitted the other crimes
evidence to show identity and not as evidence that Reldan committed the murders.
The judge gave a limiting instruction to the jury, but the jury convicted. It is
difficult to disagree with the appellate court that admission of the other crimes
evidence was highly prejudicial: “The intrusion of the evidence of these prior
crimes into this trial clearly had the high potential for prejudice recognized in our
cases . . . .”46 The appellate court reversed Reldan’s murder convictions.
One sees the State’s predicament. The prosecution could not win at trial
number one without the prior crimes evidence and now it cannot introduce that
evidence at trial number three. The State obviously believed Reldan was the
39. See State v. Reldan, 495 A.2d. 76 (N.J. 1985); State v. Reldan, 449 A.2d. 1317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982).
40. Reldan, 495 A.2d at 79.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 80.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Id. at 78.
46. State v. Reldan, 449 A.2d. 1317, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
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murderer, meaning that the prosecution had to find a third way. And it did. “In
anticipation of the third trial, the State moved before the trial court for a
reconsideration of the May 1979 suppression order.”47 The trial court agreed “that
a new hearing on the suppression issue was warranted.” One wonders why. The
“law of the case” should have foreclosed reconsideration of a motion that the State
lost and did not appeal. The trial court once again suppressed the evidence
“because ‘the execution of the warrant went beyond its scope’ and there were no
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search.”48 The State appealed the
trial court’s ruling on an interlocutory basis.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the Fourth
Amendment permitted use of the forensic evidence at trial number three. The court
held the search was within the scope of the warrant on the somewhat tenuous
ground that a microscopic search might uncover “soil particles, debris, paint chips
and the like” related to the break-in.49 But how does a warrant that does not
mention those items satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant
must “particular[] describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized”?50
No, the real reason the majority allowed the prosecution to introduce the
forensic evidence becomes plain in the part of the opinion rejecting the defendant’s
“law of the case” argument. The underlying “law of the case” principle, as
described by Justice Holmes, is the “practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen
what has been decided” in a particular case.51 But as the state court concluded, a
court can refuse to apply the “law of the case” principle by showing that deciding
the issue differently would on balance produce more good than harm. The state
supreme court tipped its hand when it noted that “a great deal could be lost in terms
of the search for truth through the suppression of otherwise reliable evidence if
reconsideration [of the suppression issue] were to be foreclosed” in Reldan’s
case.52 Translated: the State needs this evidence to convict a murderer. And in trial
number three he was convicted and sentenced to life for one murder, and thirty
years for the other.53
Even with the powerful hydraulic of not freeing a murderer operating in the
State’s favor, two justices dissented. Justice O’Hern began the dissent this way:
In the circumstances of this case, after six years and two trials, we
should not reverse a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. I recognize that the law of the case doctrine is not an
47. Reldan, 495 A.2d at 79.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 81.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
52. Reldan, 495 A.2d at 87.
53. Telephone conversation with Criminal Court Clerk, Bergen County, N.J. (Sept. 21, 2003) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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inexorable mandate to such a conclusion. Still I believe, as does
the majority, that the doctrine expresses public policy concerns
that should guide a court’s discretion. We differ on the application
of those policies to the case.54
In almost every case involving a Fourth Amendment violation, admitting
physical evidence seized from the defendant would serve the truth. Prior to Mapp,
states could promote the search for truth by not applying the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. After Mapp, that was no longer a choice. But has all that much
changed? If evidence is needed to convict a murderer, a court can simply interpret
the Fourth Amendment so that it is not violated or find an exception, such as the
officer’s good faith. Discretion has shifted from rules affecting all cases to
discretion in individual cases, but discretion remains.
Of course, the principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its
handmaiden, the exclusionary rule, is to deter police from running roughshod over
those suspected of crime. We have no idea how well that works, but there are
reasons to be skeptical even if we assume police behave in ways that reduce the
likelihood of exclusion. Mapp told us it was closing the only door remaining open
to evidence seized by lawless official conduct. Really? Imagine you are a state
trooper, it is late at night, and you pull a car over for speeding. The driver and
passengers are young men who appear nervous and you decide to “fish” for
evidence of crime. If there is a problem with license and registration, you might be
able to impound the car. An inventory of the trunk will dutifully record the
recently-fired handgun that had just killed someone. It will be admissible at trial.
If there are no grounds for impoundment, you can try for consent. “You don’t
mind if I look around in your car” might work even if the driver/owner knows
about the gun. We might have to litigate whether “look around in your car”
includes the trunk, but in a murder case I have little doubt that the State wins that
question. If that fails, a few questions (what are you doing out so late at night)
might trigger a response that creates probable cause. The driver might say they
were returning from a concert at the same time one passenger said they had been
working late. Probable cause? In a murder case where the State does not have a
confession, it just might be. And, of course, police can always lie about consent:
The officer searches the trunk; if he finds nothing, he lets the car go on its way; if
he finds the handgun, he later testifies that the driver consented.
If inventory and consent fail, and you decide not to lie, you let the car go. You
cannot catch all the fish in the lake, but you can catch your limit by the strategies
outlined above. Is any of this surprising? It should not be as long as you remember
the first word in “criminal justice system.” When that criminal is a murderer, the
Spiotto study suggests the door to evidence is open quite wide.
Now of course it might be that the justices in the Mapp majority were aware

54. Reldan, 495 A.2d at 87 (O’Hern, dissenting).
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of the vast discretion that judges have in Fourth Amendment cases—what exactly
is an unreasonable search and seizure? But, the language in the opinion suggests
the Court thought it was providing defendants a reasonably clear-cut rule. The
Court noted that it “has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it
does against the Federal Government” the other rights in the Bill of Rights, and it
intended to enforce the Fourth Amendment the same way.55 The Court said that it
had “required of federal law officers a strict adherence to [the Fourth Amendment
and its exclusionary rule] which this Court has held to be a clear, specific and
constitutionally required” remedy.56 And the Court now required the same of state
officers. As noted earlier, the Court said it was closing “the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness.”57
Moreover, at the time Mapp was decided, the Court’s federal search and
seizure cases presented a relatively clear-cut set of doctrines. Since 1961, the
Fourth Amendment doctrine has become more complex, with more doctrines and
exceptions. Though I cannot prove cause and effect, one potential explanation for
the current mess of doctrines and exceptions is the reluctance to suppress reliable
evidence of guilt.
The Court’s idealism was assuming that police, prosecutors, and judges would
approach each Fourth Amendment issue as if it were dis-embodied from the crime
being prosecuted. As James Spiotto observed, what counts as a Fourth Amendment
violation in a minor drug possession case just might not be a Fourth Amendment
violation in a murder case.
Are we to assume that police and prosecutors were ten times more careful in
those serious, violent crime cases? You are free to do so. I prefer to think that there
is sufficient play in the Fourth Amendment joints to permit judges to admit
evidence in most cases if the crime is serious enough.
Is that a bad development? I’m not sure. But I am relatively sure it is not a
development the Warren Court anticipated.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL MIRAGE
By 1962, when Arthur Goldberg took the seat of Felix Frankfurter, the Warren
Court had a solid core of reformers. In addition to Warren and Goldberg, Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and either Black or Clark, sometimes both, could be counted
on to seek to expand due process protections for state suspects and defendants.
Justice Goldberg only served three years but was replaced by the equally reformminded Abe Fortas.58 The reformers must have been particularly aghast when they
contemplated the fifteen states that did not make a routine appointment of counsel

55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
56. Id. at 648.
57. Id. at 654–55.
58. Justice Black and Justice Fortas supplied the critical votes to create the narrow five justice majority in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Justice Clark dissented in three of the four Miranda cases.
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to indigent felony defendants. It is difficult today to believe that Betts v. Brady
held in 1942 that the Due Process Clause permitted a State to deny counsel to an
indigent tried for robbery.59
As Justice Black said for the Court when overruling Betts in Gideon v.
Wainwright, one of the first major reform cases, “[R]eason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”60 There were
no dissents.61 The only puzzle is why it took until 1963 to read due process to
include the right to counsel for indigents in felony cases. Indeed, Justice Douglas
in a concurring opinion in 1961 had it right: “I cannot believe that a majority of
the present Court would agree to Betts v. Brady were it here de novo . . . .”62
Problem solved, right? Uh, no. The solution was not as simple as the Gideon
Court seemed to think. The Court, of course, cannot order funding for any right
that it creates. The right to counsel would later expand to include any offense for
which a defendant serves even a day in jail.63 How would governments provide
free lawyers to every defendant who faced a realistic prospect of jail time? The
answer: Not very well.
A horrendous example of a failing public defender system is the crisis in
Louisiana. In Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, a public defender office of ten lawyers
was, in March 2016, reduced to a single lawyer, Natasha George. 64 Ms. George
handed out applications for defense representation, telling the indigent defendants
they would be put on a wait list that is “over 2,300 names long and growing.”65 For
those denied bail, the waiting would be done in jail. In the words of Jay Dixon, the
chief executive of the Louisiana Public Defender Board, “We have essentially been
managing a financial collapse.”66
Here is the noble idea that Gideon expressed:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is
in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before

59. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
60. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
61. Id. at 336. Justice Clark concurred in the judgment, id. at 347, though why he did not join Justice
Black’s opinion for the Court is not made clear in his opinion.
62. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 117 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
63. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 357 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
64. Campbell Robertson, In Louisiana, the Poor Lack Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016),
htttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/us/in-louisiana-the-poor-lack-legal-defense.html?ref=todayspaper
(on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him.67
And here is the reality. Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, reporters for the
National Committee on the Right to Counsel, concluded that indigent defense in
2009 faced a national crisis: “By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S.
criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically
underfinanced.”68 The underfinancing leads to ineffective assistance of counsel,
“excessive public defender caseloads and insufficient salaries and compensation
for defense lawyers.”69 Or as Donald Dripps puts it with his characteristic
pithiness: “indigent defense is constitutionally required, but only in anemic
form.”70
Part of the Warren Court’s idealism that underlies and undermines the right to
counsel for indigent defendants is the assumption that legislatures would care what
nine justices said about the need to provide the guiding hand of counsel for indigent
defendants, most of whom are factually guilty. The very fact that fifteen states did
not provide indigent felony defendants with counsel prior to Gideon should have
been a cautionary tale to the reformers who expected Gideon to deliver equal
justice.
The standard liberal critique of Gideon’s implementation is that it is all about
money. More money will solve the problem. But this misses the most fundamental
Warren Court idealism. The Gideon Court assumed that by pressing one lever or
two levers, the rest of the criminal justice “machine” remains static. William Stuntz
articulates the classic critique of this separation into airtight categories:
Most talk about the law of criminal procedure treats that law as a
self-contained universe. The picture looks something like this:
The Supreme Court says that suspects and defendants have a right
to be free from certain types of police or prosecutorial behavior.
Police and prosecutors, for the most part, then do as they’re told.
When they don’t, and when the misconduct is tied to criminal
convictions, the courts reverse the convictions, thereby sending a
message to misbehaving officials. Within the bounds of this
picture there is room for a lot of debate . . . . But for all their
variety, these debates take for granted the same basic picture of
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
68. Backus & Marcus, supra note 7, at 1045.
69. Id. at 1045–46; see also NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
70. Dripps, supra note 7, at 924.
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the process, a process whose only variables are the rules
themselves and the remedies for their violation.
The picture is, of course, wrong. Criminal procedure’s rules and
remedies are embedded in a larger system, a system that can adjust
to those rules in ways other than obeying them.71
Thus, as Dripps has argued, as long as the system permits long sentences,
multiple overlapping criminal offenses, and no control over plea bargaining,
prosecutors can achieve the punishment they want almost without regard to the
quality of defense counsel.72 In his words: “improving indigent defense without
reining in sentence severity and prosecutorial discretion would do little good. It
might even do harm if prosecutors respond to the heightened risks of losing trials
by increasing the trial penalty.”73
A classic example is Bordenkircher v. Hayes,74 a thoroughly shameful case.
The State charged Paul Hayes with uttering a forged instrument in the amount of
$88.30. The prosecutor offered a plea deal of five years and told Hayes and his
lawyer that if he did not accept the deal, the prosecutor would refile charges under
the state’s Habitual Criminal Act with its mandatory life sentence.75 The habitual
offender act applied to Hayes based on two prior convictions that netted him five
years in the juvenile reformatory and five years on probation.76 In sum, the
prosecutor threatened a defendant who had never served a day in adult prison with
a life sentence for a crime worth $88.30 if he did not accept the plea deal of five
years. Hayes claimed to be innocent of the forged instrument charge and,
presumably with counsel from his lawyer, refused the plea deal. The prosecutor
carried through on his threat, and Hayes was convicted of the third felony and
sentenced to life in prison.
The Court held, 5-4, that nothing in the Due Process Clause forbade the
prosecutor from threatening to up the ante to life in prison if Hayes did not accept
the plea deal. A juvenile offense, an adult felony for which he received probation,
and uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30 resulted in Paul Hayes
getting a life sentence. The greatest lawyer in history, Cicero himself, could do
nothing to prevent the prosecutor from making this threat and could do nothing to
defend his client if Hayes refused to take the five-year deal. The combination of
no oversight of plea bargaining and a draconian sentencing structure (repealed not
long after Hayes was sentenced)77 made the right to counsel essentially
71. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 3.
72. Dripps, supra note 7, at 924.
73. Id. at 915.
74. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
75. Id. at 358–59.
76. Id. at 359 n.3.
77. Id. at 358 (noting repeal in 1975). To add to Mr. Hayes’s bad luck, he could not have been sentenced
to life in prison under the revised Kentucky statute. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 42 n.1 (6th Cir. 1976).
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meaningless.
The rest of the Paul Hayes story? He received parole after serving five years.78
It seems the Kentucky parole board thought that the prosecutor’s initial offer was
the proper measure of punishment. It seems too harsh to me, but it is certainly
fairer than life in prison.
Are indigent defendants in the fifteen states that did not provide counsel prior
to Gideon better off today? The system looks fairer. A defense lawyer stands
beside the defendant when he pleads guilty or (rarely) goes to trial. But is the plea,
or the trial, really better for indigent defendants because a lawyer is present for the
proceedings? Ask Paul Hayes. A true cynic would argue that, as a group, indigent
defendants receive about the same level of punishment with defense counsel as
they would receive if the prosecutor had no formal adversary. There is no way to
test that proposition, but its very plausibility suggests that Gideon has largely been
a failure.
III. THE CONFLICTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE
The Court announced Gideon on March 18, 1963. That day and the next, the
Court heard argument in a case that, paired with Gideon, scholars once regarded
as a superhero in the criminal procedure world.79 It was Brady v. Maryland,
announced two months after Gideon.80 The Brady Court held that “suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”81 Later cases would essentially
discard the “upon request” part of Brady, creating what seems at first blush to be
a broad right for defendants to be given favorable evidence in the hands of the
prosecution.82 It is not surprising that the Court granted certiorari in Gideon and
Brady in the same term and decided them within two months of each other.
Without Gideon, Brady would be largely pointless in the fifteen states that did not
routinely provide counsel to indigent felony defendants. And without access to
exculpatory evidence in the hands of the State, the right to counsel would not be
an effective shield against an unfair or even wrongful conviction.
Brady appeared in 1963 to be an important protection against the conviction
of innocent defendants. It was not to be. The reader has already realized that even

78. He was paroled on December 28, 1978. Letter from Kentucky Department of Corrections to author
(Dec. 3, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Hayes was convicted of the habitual
offender charge in April 1973. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (No. 761334), 1977 WL 189700 at *3. Assuming he began his sentence shortly thereafter, the sentence would have been
roughly five years.
79. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland,
33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002).
80. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
81. Id. at 87.
82. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 101 (1976).
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a robust discovery right is likely to be of little value if the case is one among
hundreds of felony cases that a public defender has on her desk. But Brady turned
out to be fragile in its own way. At the same time the Court was removing the
“upon request” part of Brady, it was defining “material” in a way that made it easy
for prosecutors to withhold evidence that was favorable but not clear proof of
innocence. The Court has used multiple locutions for what defendants must show
to demonstrate a Brady violation. One that is particularly difficult for defendants
to meet on appeal is to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”83 Translated: If the defendant cannot show a reasonable
probability of an acquittal with the withheld evidence, the prosecutor did not
violate the Due Process Clause.
As Scott Sundby has pointed out,84 if Brady is limited to evidence that creates
a reasonable probability of an acquittal, it might not affect many cases. Would
ethical prosecutors routinely turn over evidence that creates a reasonable doubt
about guilt and then proceed to trial? One hopes not. Of course, one can imagine a
case where evidence in the hands of the prosecutor creates a reasonable doubt
about guilt in the mind of the prosecutor but she believes that the case she will
present at trial will prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even if she discloses the
exculpatory evidence. Those cases are probably not very common.
However that question is resolved, the real problem is that the decision to turn
over Brady material is in the hands of the prosecutor. Prosecutors in the American
system are advocates. In European systems, prosecutors are trained separately and
typically never practice law as an advocate.85 Their duty is to help reach a just and
accurate result. In the United States, of course, prosecutors are trained to be
advocates in law school and then selected from the ranks of those who are
successful advocates in practice.86 It should not surprise that prosecutors continue
to be advocates. Yes, they want to convict only the guilty, but as advocates, they
want to win convictions. That means that prosecutors naturally view evidence
favorable to defendants in the most pro-prosecution way possible. That is not a
criticism of prosecutors; it is simply the way advocates think. And, once
prosecutors view favorable evidence in the most pro-prosecution way possible, that
reduces the universe of material that prosecutors must disclose to the defense. Dan
Medwed explores this problem in Prosecution Complex: America’s Race to
Convict and Its Impact on the Innocent.87
Another problem with Brady is the black hole problem. When a prosecutor
does not disclose arguably exculpatory evidence, most defendants will go to prison
83. Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality).
84. Sundby, supra note 79, at 661.
85. I explore this difference between European and American prosecutors in George C. Thomas III,
Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT (Daniel S. Medwed ed., 2017).
86. See id.
87. Id.
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never knowing of a potential Brady violation. The evidence is, by definition,
hidden. Perhaps a witness will come forward later, or an open records request will
dislodge the exculpatory evidence, but one suspects that most defendants never
learn of the failure to disclose. We really have no way to know the scope of the
Brady problem. We do know that in a sample of cases from the National Registry
of Exonerations, 13% of exonerations involve a Brady violation.88 That means that
in 13% of the convictions of innocent defendants, a court held that the defendant
met the stringent standard of showing probable innocence, yet the prosecutors
failed to disclose the evidence. But, we do not know how many undiscovered
Brady claims are out there, like unexploded ordinance left over from a war.
Finally, even when a defendant discovers that prosecutors withheld potentially
favorable evidence, and even if the Court crafted a less pro-prosecution standard
for review on appeal, there is a hydraulic working against defendants. The only
remedy is to vacate the conviction and start over; this time, by definition, the
defendant will have a better shot at an acquittal or hung jury. To be sure, defendants
who win Brady cases are presumably more likely to be innocent than the gardenvariety defendant who pleads guilty, but courts are still loath to vacate a conviction
of a probably guilty defendant.
The Warren Court idealism here is the assumption that prosecutors can put
aside their training and decades of experience as an advocate-lawyer and suddenly
become an unbiased minister of justice who looks at the State’s case with skeptical
eyes. Does that make sense even at a superficial level? The Warren Court idealism
that undermines Gideon is subtle. But the idealism that sees prosecutors policing
their files to turn over helpful evidence to defense lawyers so they can mount a
better defense is almost grotesque.
A rational system of justice would have an examining magistrate overseeing
the case and giving the defense what it needs. For example, a defendant in a
homicide case claimed she was attacked in a motel room by a man with a knife
and defended herself by turning his knife against him.89 The prosecutor did not
disclose the victim’s conviction of carrying a deadly weapon and his conviction of
assault and carrying a deadly weapon.90 Are these convictions relevant to the
defendant’s claim of self-defense? You bet. Exculpatory? Yes, because they create
an inference that she is telling the truth about him attacking her. Material under
Brady? No, the Court held 7-2. The jury heard evidence that the victim was
wearing a Bowie knife and had another knife in his pocket. His criminal record
was thus “largely cumulative.”91 Really? It is one thing to carry a knife and another
for the State to convict of carrying a deadly weapon; we do not know why the State
charged him with carrying the deadly weapon, but he must have done something
to call attention to himself. And even if that conviction is cumulative, how can a
88.
89.
90.
91.
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conviction of assault and carrying a deadly weapon be cumulative? It is one thing
to carry a deadly weapon and another to assault someone while carrying a deadly
weapon. I believe an impartial examining magistrate would disclose both
convictions to the defense. Ask yourself why the prosecutor did not disclose the
convictions. It was almost certainly his belief that if the defense could introduce
those convictions, obtaining a conviction in the homicide case would be less likely.
The Court never asked itself this rather obvious question.
One suspects the Brady Court realized that it was asking prosecutors to do the
impossible. But here, as in Gideon, what choice did the Court have? The Court
does not have the power to force 50 states to create the office of examining
magistrate with a specific set of constitutionally-required duties. No, the Brady
solution, like the Gideon solution, was all the Court could do. A cynic would say
that both seminal Warren Court decisions make the pre-trial and trial process
appear fairer without actually making them fairer.
IV. MIRANDA, MIRANDA, WHEREFORE ART THOU, MIRANDA?
So far, we have concluded that the Court’s 1960s idealism has given
defendants and suspects an exclusionary rule “solution” to Fourth Amendment
violations that can be avoided in myriad ways. The Court’s idealism has also given
defendants a right to counsel that might not really change much in terms of the
punishment delivered over the universe of indigent defendants, and a right to have
the State disclose exculpatory evidence that probably does not actually produce
much exculpatory evidence. What about our old friend, Miranda v. Arizona?92 This
one is trickier to assess because what the Court sought to achieve in Miranda is
not easy to discern. One reading, perhaps the most persuasive one, is that the Court
wished to empower suspects to resist police interrogation if that was their
preference. Much of the language in the opinion supports this reading: “We have
concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely.”93
The problem, as Seidman, Allen, and others have convincingly
demonstrated,94 is that at the moment the suspect opens his mouth and says
something, his preference was to speak. What does it mean to empower a suspect
to speak “freely”? Wigmore was correct a century ago when he claimed that the
notion of an involuntary or unfree confession is incoherent: “As between the rack
and a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable;

92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
93. Id. at 467.
94. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 (2006); Louis Michael
Seidman, Rubashov’s Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 149, 174 (1990); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1215 (2017).
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but it is nonetheless voluntarily chosen”95 All conscious choices are voluntarily
made, even “your money or your life.”
If the Miranda Court’s goal was merely to tell the suspect he need not talk and
can consult with a lawyer,96 then we can conclude it has been enormously
successful. The warnings seem sufficient to communicate those two ideas to
almost all suspects:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in
a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.97
Few suspects would fail to understand these warnings. To be sure, a suspect
might forget the warnings if he endures a lengthy interrogation. But I have
difficulty believing the suspect who begins to answer police questions does so
without knowing, at least as an abstract matter, that he does not have to answer. If
this is right, and if Miranda’s purpose was merely to convey information to the
suspect, then we can conclude it has been quite a success.
But, the tenor of the Court’s opinion suggests that its goal was something more
than ensuring a bare, abstract level of knowledge that a suspect need not talk to
police. Both civil libertarians and crime control advocates read the opinion more
broadly. Much of the opinion speaks of police interrogation as a shady, if not
downright illegitimate, enterprise. Three quotes will suffice to make the point
(though I could produce a dozen or more).
It is important [for police interrogators] to keep the subject off
balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself
or his surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him
out of exercising his constitutional rights. . . .
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the
specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades
on the weakness of individuals. . . .
In the cases before us today, given this background, we concern
ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the

95. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, § 824 (2d ed. 1923).
96. See George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process
Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2001).
97. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
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evils it can bring.98
These broadsides against police interrogators suggest the Court sought to reorder a suspect’s preferences so he would not want to talk to police. That reading
is the one the Miranda dissents embraced. As Justice White put it in his dissent:
The obvious underpinning of the Court's decision is a deep-seated
distrust of all confessions. As the Court declares that the accused
may not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver
of the right to counsel, and as the Court all but admonishes the
lawyer to advise the accused to remain silent, the result adds up to
a judicial judgment that evidence from the accused should not be
used against him in any way, whether compelled or not. This is
the not so subtle overtone of the opinion—that it is inherently
wrong for the police to gather evidence from the accused
himself.99
But one might respond, as Justice White responded: why would that be an
illegitimate goal? Why would the Court want to discourage guilty suspect from
confessing? In White’s words:
I see nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing
unconstitutional, in the police's asking a suspect whom they have
reasonable cause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in
confronting him with the evidence on which the arrest was based,
at least where he has been plainly advised that he may remain
completely silent.100
Justice Harlan made the same point in his dissent: “Society has always paid a
stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark
moments of the law.”101
If the Court’s goal in Miranda was to reorder preferences to make suspects
more resistant to police interrogators, then it has been an abject failure. Though
my friend Paul Cassell has argued for decades that Miranda has suppressed the
rate at which police obtain confessions,102 the effect is at the margin, if it exists at

98. Id. at 455–56.
99. Id. at 538–39 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 50 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social
Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L REV. 90 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).
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all. Roughly 80% of suspects waive Miranda and talk (freely?) to police.103 While
we do not know for sure how many suspects refused to talk to police prior to
Miranda, it was roughly in the 20% range.104 So Miranda has, perhaps, stiffened
the resolve, reordered the preferences, of a percent or two or three of suspects.
And it is entirely possible (though Cassell does not see the world this way) that
Miranda actually facilitates police efforts to get suspects to incriminate
themselves. If the suspect expects the third degree, he might be inclined to say
nothing, as suspects often did in the “bad old days” of the third degree. But today
we have a friendly cop who tells you that you need not talk to him but, by the way,
this is your last and best chance to tell your side of the story. Of course, police
probably always stressed that suspects should tell their side of the story but the
strategy is likely more effective after hearing the soothing warnings.
Though the analogy is far from perfect, consider the interrogations of al-Qaeda
detainees after 9/11. Special agent Ali Soufan claims that the use of nonthreatening
techniques can confuse detainees and lead them to cooperate. “[E]ngaging and
outwitting” detainees often proves more productive than coercion.105 “Cruel
interrogation techniques not only serve to reinforce what a terrorist has been
prepared to expect if captured; they give him a greater sense of control and
predictability about his experience, and strengthen his resistance.”106 Soufan
claims that he was quite successful in using these nonthreatening techniques in the
wake of 9/11, but when the CIA began outsourcing interrogations to operatives
who applied increasing levels of coercion (like waterboarding), the level of
cooperation declined.
Consider the interrogation of a murder suspect in Berghuis v. Thompkins.107
Detective Helgert gave the suspect Miranda warnings and had him read the fifth
warning aloud: “You have the right to decide at any time before or during
questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer
while you are being questioned.”108 This is not part of the warnings the Miranda
Court required but it strikes me as a good idea. Thompkins thus knew that he
controlled whether and when to answer questions.
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, Helgert asked
Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?” Thompkins made eye
contact with Helgert and said “Yes,” as his eyes “well[ed] up with

103. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 102, at 839; Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 282–83 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1959 (2004).
104. See George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda A Real-World Failure: A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical
Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996).
105. ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 9/11 AND THE WAR AGAINST ALQAEDA 423 (2011).
106. Id.
107. 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
108. Id. at 375.
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tears.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God?” Thompkins said
“Yes.” Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for
shooting that boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked
away. Thompkins refused to make a written confession, and the
interrogation ended about 15 minutes later.109
Though obviously I cannot prove it, I believe that had Helgert applied the third
degree to Thompkins, without giving him Miranda warnings, Thompkins would
not have responded to the questions about God. If that is right, Miranda laid the
groundwork for the clever police interrogation strategy to succeed. Maybe
Miranda is the clever police officer’s friend.
V. REFORM GOING FORWARD
The problem the Court faced in the 1960s was not just its idealism but most
fundamentally the lack of a mechanism for making meaningful reforms in the four
areas we have discussed. At least on the right to counsel, Dripps is not as
pessimistic as I am. He posits the possibility of a second revolution in the Court’s
criminal procedure that would require judicial supervision of plea bargaining
where trial courts could “refuse[] to enter a plea absent a record of factual
investigation and sound legal advice by counsel.”110 I do not see this happening in
the lifetime of anyone reading this essay. Of course, as Dripps realizes, by itself
this would be an insufficient solution to the counsel problem. As long as
prosecutors can up the ante by charging multiple offenses that have long prison
sentences, the defendant is not likely to benefit much from counsel. Thus, the
second revolution would have to include reading the Eighth Amendment to
drastically limit the power of legislatures to create draconian punishment schemes,
and the Double Jeopardy Clause to forbid prosecutors to charge multiple offenses
out of a single course of criminal conduct. This seems even less likely to me.
Dripps also posits the possibility of a legislative solution, recommending
various reform proposals. The problem here is that it is a 50 state process. So far,
some 25 years after it became clear that innocent defendants were being
convicted,111 no state has addressed that problem with a comprehensive revision
of its criminal procedure designed to protect innocent suspects and defendants.112

109. Id. at 376.
110. Dripps, supra note 7, at 918.
111. See, e.g., Edward Connors, et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the
Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (1996).
112. To be sure, there have been beneficial piece-meal revisions of state procedures in a handful of states.
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (eyewitness identifications); Robert P. Mosteller, N.C.
Inquiry Commission’s First Decade: Impressive Successes and Lessons Learned, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1725 (2016)
(discussing several North Carolina reform ideas in addition to eyewitness identification); Christine C. Mumma,
The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined By a Common Cause, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 647, 654 (2003) (same).

863

2020 / The Warren Court, Idealism, and the 1960s
Why start now?
One of my students suggested that Congress could force the needed legal
machinery on all 50 states, either directly or by creating incentives for states to do
so. The first problem, of course, is that Congress in modern times cannot agree on
what day of the week it is, let alone pass meaningful legislation. But passing that
problem, and assuming the miracle of a functioning Congress, I very much doubt
the Constitution permits Congress to dictate to the states a code of criminal
procedure. I see nothing in Article I, section 8 that could be stretched to justify
forcing the states to follow a standard criminal procedure.113
Could it achieve the same goal by making federal criminal justice funding
contingent on states adopting a reform-minded comprehensive criminal code? The
problem here is two-fold. First, creating effective counsel requires reworking not
only state criminal procedure but also the substantive criminal law. I doubt states
receive enough federal criminal justice funding to persuade them to undertake that
gargantuan task. Second, all four reforms (putting teeth into Miranda and the
Fourth Amendment, and strengthening the role of counsel and right to exculpatory
evidence) will result in fewer convictions. While some of these will be factually
innocent defendants, many will be guilty. So ,Congress is going to tell all 50 states
to completely rework their substantive criminal law and their criminal procedure
to let more guilty defendants go free or lose X dollars in federal criminal justice
funding? My bet is that almost all states will tell Congress to keep its criminal
justice funding.
Even if we had a second criminal procedure revolution or a sudden willingness
of states to change their criminal procedure and substantive criminal law, the
Fourth Amendment problem seems insoluble to me. I thought about requiring
search warrants for all searches except incident to arrest, but this depends on judges
reading affidavits with care and rejecting warrants based on thin probable cause.
Available evidence suggests this is another example of starry-eyed idealism.114 The
tort remedy appears to have worked well as a deterrent of over-zealous policing in
colonial days and our first century as a nation. But that was because Americans in
those times valued privacy and autonomy more than they feared crime. I do not
believe that to be true today. Colonial juries came to the defense of printers and
publishers, but would juries today really give murderers a tort judgment because
the police used the wrong search warrant form? Color me extremely doubtful. So
maybe there is no solution to the Fourth Amendment problem. Police will cut
corners to solve serious crimes and courts will bend the rules in many cases to
convict dangerous criminals. Maybe that is not a bad problem.115
113. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
114. The National Center for State Courts reported in one city studied, the average length of magisterial
review was a mere two minutes and forty-eight seconds; ten percent of the warrant applications were approved in
less than one minute. RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 31 (1984).
115. To be sure, too much bending of the rules can lead to the conviction of the innocent, but the latest
data suggest that the problem is less severe than many have believed. See George C. Thomas III, Where Have All
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have examined four Warren Court attempts to reform the criminal process
to give more power and control to suspects and defendants. And we have four more
or less failures. What lesson should we learn from this experiment?
The first lesson is that the Warren Court, indulging its 1960s idealism, put far
too much faith in the willingness of relevant actors in the criminal justice system
to apply in a meaningful way the solutions the Court created. Could the Court have
done more? If the Court in 1966, for example, thought police were tricking or
cajoling too many incriminating statements from suspects, the answer was not
Miranda warnings that, it turns out, were ineffective in stiffening the resolve of
suspects to resist police interrogation. No, the solution was to hold that all
statements made in response to police interrogation were compelled and
inadmissible. Period.
There are two problems with that solution. First, the politics would have been
ugly. It seems unlikely that Warren could have gotten four other votes for what
would have amounted to the abolition of police interrogation. The reaction to
Miranda in the country and the Congress was intensely hostile.116 The reaction to
abolition of interrogation would have been far worse. But the more fundamental
problem is that abolition of police interrogation runs directly contrary to the 1960s
liberal agenda that believed in empowering, not denying, choice. To take away a
suspect’s ability to cooperate with the police would have stood liberal ideology of
the time on its head.
The Warren Court saw four severe problems with state criminal justice in the
1960s. The Court tried to fix the problems. It largely failed. Can we do better?
Don’t hold your breath.
And what of the Brown v. Board of Education revolution followed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964? Here is a small piece of discouraging data. In 1973, the Court
ruled that federal courts could order desegregation remedies in schools outside the
South if courts found that official actions had kept a substantial part of a school
system racially segregated.117 One potential court-ordered remedy was busing.
There was much political opposition to forced busing, particularly in the
Northeast.118 Government data show that the percentage of African-American
students in what it calls “intensely segregated minority schools” in the Northeast
steadily rose from about 42% in 1973 to about 50% in 1991 and has stayed about
the same since.119 Even with the wind of Brown at their back, courts could not keep
the Innocents Gone?, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (2018) (estimating rate of convictions of innocent defendants at 1/8%
to 1/2%).
116. See, e.g., LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 243–44 (1983); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE
SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 158 (1970).
117. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
118. See, e.g., MATTHEW F. DELMONT, WHY BUSING FAILED: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE NATIONAL
RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2016).
119. Gary Orfield, et al., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT
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school segregation from growing worse in the Northeast.
Courts can, perhaps, help improve society at the margin. But, in the main,
America will have the legal world it chooses through its legislatures. Justice
Holmes,120 Justice Brandeis,121 Justice Frankfurter,122 Justice Harlan,123 and Justice
Scalia,124 to name five deep thinkers, would agree. Should we? Up to you.

UNCERTAIN FUTURE 12, fig. 3 (2014). To be sure, the percentage of African-American students in
segregated schools declined in other parts of the country, particularly the South, but the trend peaked around 1990
and has been rising nationwide since. Id. And the states with the largest percentage of African-American students
in racially segregated schools? Did you guess New York, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey? Id. at
20, tbl. 9.
120. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting on the ground that the
Constitution “is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States”).
121. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
122. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (writing for the Court holding that it is up to each
state to decide whether to require exclusion of evidence seized in an unreasonable search or seizure), overruled
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
123. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that “[s]tates
have always borne primary responsibility for operating the machinery of criminal justice within their borders, and
adapting it to their particular circumstances”).
124. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 438, 465 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
has no right to ignore “the will of the People’s representatives in Congress” unless it finds that the Constitution
demands a contrary result).
AND AN

866

